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Abstract How do economic downturns affect citizens’ support for welfare state 
retrenchment?  Existing observational studies fail to isolate the effect of economic conditions 
and the effect of elite framing of these conditions. We therefore designed a survey 
experiment to evaluate how economic change in conjunction with different elite frames 
impact on citizens’ support for welfare state retrenchment. We hypothesise and demonstrate 
that the effects of these frames differ by income group and partisanship. Our survey 
experiment – carried out in the UK – demonstrates that poor economic prospects generally 
motivate support for unemployment benefits vis-à-vis deficit reduction. Emphasis on 
inequality does not change this picture. Emphasis on government debt and deficits increases 
support for retrenchment compared to objective information. We find support for the 
hypothesis that partisans are less responsive to the economy than independents. However, 
income differences are a surprisingly weak moderator of our treatments. We derive two main 
conclusions: first, elite frames significantly influence the effect of economic change on 
welfare state preferences. Second, party identification is crucial to understand individual 
differences in welfare state preferences and should receive more attention in future research.  
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Under which conditions welfare state retrenchment is politically feasible is an important 
debate in contemporary social policy research. It has been noted that retrenchment often 
occurs against the background of poor economic conditions (Kitschelt 2001; Korpi and Palme 
2003; Starke 2008; Vis 2009).  The reason for this can partly be related to a functional logic: 
poor economic conditions create ‘objective’ problem pressure, possibly implying the need to 
reform the welfare state. However, there is also a political logic: poor economic conditions 
might be used by political elites, such as parties and politicians, to convince citizens of the 
need to reform the welfare state (van Kersbergen and Vis 2014). 
In this research note, we want to shed light on the link between economic conditions and 
popular support of welfare state retrenchment. In doing so, we make four contributions to the 
literature. First, we advance the debate about welfare state retrenchment by linking it to a 
broader political science literature on how the economy affects citizens’ left-right 
preferences. Second, we use a framing experiment in the United Kingdom to analyse the 
effect of different ways in which elites can communicate economic developments. While 
common in psychology and communication research, framing experiments are not frequently 
used in social policy research. This is unfortunate, because social constructivism, a dominant 
perspective in welfare state theory, emphasises the crucial role of elite framing on public 
opinion (Béland 2005; Cox 2001; Schmidt 2002). Third, the results of our survey experiment 
in the United Kingdom show that objective information about the economy has a significant 
and negative effect on public support for retrenching unemployment benefits. The results 
change, however, when objective economic information is combined with different frames, 
for instance about budget deficits. Fourth, we show that there is meaningful individual 
variation in how citizens receive frames about the economy. While income differences matter 
surprisingly little, party identification is a strong moderator of framing effects. Respondents 
who feel close to a party show significantly weaker responses to our stimuli than 
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independents. By pointing to the relevance of partisan bias, we challenge the political 
economy assumption that social policy preferences primarily reflect economically 
instrumental motives.  
 
Economic conditions and economic preferences 
Whether and how economic downturns affect citizens’ economic left-right preferences is an 
unresolved question.  Do economic downturns increase support for left-wing economic 
policies through citizens’ concern about unemployment risk and social inequality? Some 
studies indeed demonstrate that in times of economic crises public opinion shifts to the left 
(Blekesaune, 2007; Kam & Nam, 2008; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005). Others claim that 
economic hardship strengthens materialist considerations at the expense of “luxury” post-
materialist considerations (Inglehart, 1985) so that citizens on average become more critical 
of the welfare state. Some studies indeed show that in times of economic crisis public opinion 
shifts to the right (Durr, 1993; Stevenson, 2001).1  
After welfare state research sought to explain the absence of reform, the consensus now 
seems to be that radical retrenchment does occur (Levy 2010; van Kersbergen and Vis 2014). 
Different scholars have argued that retrenchment is more likely under the condition of 
economic problem pressure (Cox 2001; Kitschelt 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003; Marx and 
Schumacher 2013; Vis 2009; Schmidt 2002; Starke 2008). But we still know little about the 
micro foundation of this process. Does retrenchment occur in bad economic times, because 
public opinion swings to the right, as some argue? Or does it happen despite the public’s 
swing to the left, which has been observed by others? Or does the effect of the economy 
depend on political agency, as social constructivists argue? Accordingly, it is not the 
economy per se, but the way in which it is communicated by reform-minded politicians that 
makes public opinion shift. 
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A cause of the inconclusiveness of previous research is that the observational micro- or 
macro-level data this research uses provides no control over the impact of subjective 
economic perceptions and the objective state of the economy on preferences for social 
policies. Economic conditions vary over time, but also (competing) elites differ in how they 
frame economic conditions over time. Because of this the causes of public opinion change are 
difficult to isolate in observational studies. A second potential cause for the inconclusive 
results is that individuals may vary in how they respond to changes in economic conditions. 
Some people strongly identify with political parties. This goes beyond narrow support for a 
party’s policies and has even been portrayed as a source of social identity (Green et al, 2002). 
As such, party identification is a powerful psychological mechanism which helps individuals 
organising their political world-views and which motivates them to perceive reality in a way 
favourable to their party. Accordingly, partisans are more likely to take cues from elites they 
identify with (Taber & Lodge, 2006) whereas political independents are less biased in their 
perception of the economy (Kayser and Wlezien 2011). So far, the social policy literature has 
tended to ignore the concept of party identification, but based on political behaviour research, 
we would expect it to be a powerful mechanism moderating the susceptibility to welfare-state 
discourses. A second important source of individual differences is income. Simply put, poor, 
rich or middle-class individuals have different propensities to benefit from or pay for 
redistribution (Korpi and Palme, 1998). Hence, they should respond differently to economic 
downturns.  
As a consequence of these problems, we argue that experimental research designs that 
disentangle the effect of the objective economy from the effect of elite interpretations of the 
objective economy are important complements to existing observational studies.  
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Objective and Ideological Frames 
Framing experiments randomly assign individuals to different messages and differences in 
attitude between treatment groups are interpreted as framing effects. In the area of economic 
policy preferences several experiments report framing effects (Kangas et al. 2014; Malhotra 
& Margalit, 2010; Petersen et al. 2012). We build on this small but emerging literature to 
analyse the effect of three different frames – the objective frame, the inequality frame and the 
deficit frame - on a specific economic policy preference: support for benefits for the 
unemployed vis-à-vis support for deficit reduction. Specifically, our dependent variable is the 
answer to the question “Which of the two following goals do you personally think the 
government should prioritise? (1) Maintaining the standard of living for the unemployed even 
it this leads to a higher budget deficit or (2) reducing the budget deficit even if it means cuts 
in unemployment benefits”. We force respondents to choose between options to mimic real-
world political discourses in which these options are typically presented as mutually 
exclusive.  Now we turn to discussing the design and expectations for each of the three 
frames. 
First, the objective frame provides a concrete statement about unemployment “Next year 
unemployment in UK will reach an all-time high. Many jobs in the public and private sector 
will be cut.” The treatment aims to signal a poor prospective economic situation.2 By doing 
so we expect to activate two mechanisms: (1) people from low income brackets, who have 
little savings and pay little taxes, will be mainly concerned with the risk of personal job loss 
and therefore choose to defend unemployment benefits more than people in a similar socio-
economic situation who did not receive this treatment (the control group); (2) people with 
higher incomes may feel threatened by this negative economic prospect, too, and therefore 
support unemployment benefits as a means to insure themselves against future income loss. 
On the other hand, worries about higher tax burdens because of a bloated welfare state, 
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government debts and budget deficits may dominate and individuals with higher incomes 
become more supportive of retrenchment. In sum, there are competing hypotheses for the 
effect of poor economic prospects on the entire population (H1A: more support, H1B: less 
support), but we unambiguously expect more support for keeping unemployment 
programmes compared to the control group among low incomes (H2). 
Second, the inequality frame is similar to the objective frame plus this information: ”Experts 
say that unemployment benefits need to be kept at their current level to keep people from 
falling into poverty. Otherwise the UK will become a more unequal country”. We expect that 
our emphasis on inequality activates inequality aversion. Individuals are highly sensitive to 
the framing of unequal outcomes and are motivated to seek some form of distributive justice 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2011). Hence, we expect inequality aversion to be activated by this 
frame which leads to more support for the unemployment programme than in the objective 
frame (H3).  As Fong demonstrates (2001), the effect of inequality aversion should be 
irrespective of income.3 This would contradict Durr’s (1993) argument that inequality 
aversion is a luxury only affordable in good economic times. Also, we expect the prospect of 
more inequality, typical concerns of left parties, to resonate better with participants that 
identify with these parties. They should be more strongly activated than in the objective 
frame (H4).  
Third, in the deficit frame we add to the objective frame the sentence: “Experts say that 
unemployment benefits need to be cut, because the costs will skyrocket and push the budget 
further into deficit. Otherwise debts will be passed on to future generations”. This frame 
reflects a welfare critical rhetoric typically adopted by right-wing parties. By emphasizing 
debts and deficits we seek to activate concerns for higher tax burdens because of excessive 
government spending and thereby reduce the effect of inequality aversion. Survey evidence 
demonstrates that citizens that perceive the welfare state as straining the economy discount 
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redistributive goals (Giger & Nelson, 2013). Hence, we expect here that people choose to cut 
the unemployment programme for the sake of the budget, particularly if they have high 
incomes and pay more taxes (H5). Because this echoes – generally speaking – a message 
from a right-wing party, we expect participants that identify with a right-wing party to be 
more in favour of retrenching the unemployment programme than in other treatments (H6).  
So far we have formulated expectations about income and partisanship. However, many 
people do not identify with a political party. Although partisans are very responsive to 
specific party cues or cues that resonate with their beliefs, they are less responsive to non-
party cues (Taber & Lodge, 2006). This might have direct effects on how economic change is 
translated into political behaviour. It has been shown, for instance, that voters with strong 
party identification have a relatively weak tendency to adjust their voting intentions to the 
state of the economy. The frequently observed link between a poor economy and electoral 
punishment of incumbent governments (economic voting) is indeed mainly driven by 
independents. Therefore the more partisans (less independents) in a polity, the less economic 
voting takes place (Kayser & Wlezien, 2011). We think a similar logic may apply to support 
for support of welfare state retrenchment. Partisans have relatively stable ideological 
commitments and might be less receptive to our (non-partisan) cues. Independents, however, 
should be more flexible in their ideological position and more receptive to arguments 
reflected in the different cues. Our last hypothesis hence is that independents respond 
stronger on our frames than partisans (H7). Concretely, because these independents carry less 
ideological baggage, we expect them to support the unemployment programme in the 
inequality treatment but support retrenchment in the deficit treatment.   
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Table I. Overview of hypotheses 
H1A: Poor economic prospects lead to more support for unemployment benefits 
H1B: Poor economic prospects lead to less support for unemployment benefits  
H2: Poor economic prospects lead to more support for unemployment benefits for individuals with 
low-income  
H3: Poor economic prospects lead to more support for unemployment benefits if inequality is 
emphasised 
H4: Left-wing partisans support unemployment benefits more if inequality is emphasised 
H5: Poor economic prospects lead to less support for unemployment benefits if debt and deficit 
are emphasised.  
H6: Right-wing partisans support unemployment benefits less if debt and deficit are emphasised 
H7: Independents respond more strongly to our treatments than partisans 
 
 
The UK in a comparative perspective 
Citizens from different countries vary in their support of retrenchment. Overall, retrenchment 
is more likely to take place in liberal welfare states, such as the UK (Pierson, 2001).  In line 
with this expectation, welfare state support is lower in this regime type compared to the 
conservative or social democratic type (e.g. Meier Jæger, 2009). Indeed, successive British 
governments have reduced the generosity of unemployment benefits, effectively converting 
the system into a single-tier structure with low flat-rate benefits targeted at low incomes 
(Clasen, 2011). As a consequence, unemployment benefits are relatively unattractive for 
British middle-class citizens (Clasen and Koslowski, 2013).  In this situation, one would 
expect welfare state support to be more polarised across income groups than in countries with 
less targeting (Korpi and Palme, 1998). Specifically, median to high incomes should be 
susceptible to arguments for retrenching a system that has little to offer for them. 
At the time of our survey (December 2012) welfare state retrenchment had figured 
prominently in public debates for some time. Against the background of the Great Recession 
and growing budget deficits, the incumbent centre-right government had been exceptionally 
pro-retrenchment and had implemented relatively harsh cutbacks between 2010 and 2012 
(van Kersbergen et al., 2014). The underlying reform debate has potentially increased 
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citizens’ susceptibility pro-retrenchment arguments. But the fact that far-reaching reforms 
had been implemented already also could have curbed enthusiasm for further retrenchment.  
In sum, based on the institutional characteristics of the UK welfare state there is reason to 
expect that the mean support for retrenchment as well as income differences in this support 
are relatively large. With starker differences between classes and parties, the UK may be a 
most-likely case for our hypotheses. However, since we still know little about framing effects 
in the field of social policy, this would still have to be verified by systematic cross-national 
research. 
 
Design of the study 
To evaluate these claims (see Table I) we fielded an online survey experiment4 in the UK 
with ca. 3500 respondents 18 years or older in December 2012. The sample is drawn from the 
nationally representative YouGov panel. We randomly assigned respondents to one of three 
experimental conditions or the control group.  
We discuss our results in three ways. First, we compare support for retrenchment by 
experimental condition. Second, we regress support for retrenchment on dummies for the 
experimental conditions, income group and an interaction term between experimental 
condition and income. The three (annual household) income groups are low (<10’000 GBP), 
medium (10’0000 - 34’999 GBP) and high. We include the following control variables: age, 
gender, a dummy for holding a university degree, political knowledge and partisanship (for 
descriptives and operationalization see appendix). Our dependent variable is a choice 
between two options; hence we use binary logistic regression. Third, we repeat the analysis 
with an interaction term between partisanship and treatments. Respondents feeling ‘close’ or 
‘very close’ to a party are coded into left (Labour, 25.2%), right (Conservatives, 22.5%) or 
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other partisans (21.1%). Given the unclear expectations we do not show results for ‘other’ 
partisans. All remaining respondents are coded as independents (31.3%). 
  
Do Poor Economic Prospects Drive Support for Unemployment Benefits? 
Figure I displays the proportion of respondents supporting retrenchment of unemployment 
benefits. In the control group there is a majority in favour of retrenchment (58%). This is 
plausible given the political context at the time of the survey, in which the coalition of 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats strongly advocated reducing the budget deficit, not 
least by cutting unemployment benefits. We are, however, mostly interested in differences 
between experimental conditions. As predicted in H1A the poor economic prospects in the 
objective frame push respondents on average to supporting unemployment benefits (49%) 
and thus bias them against retrenchment (significantly different with p = 0.001). This 
supports H1A and rejects H1B.   
Virtually the same proportion of respondents (49%) supports keeping the unemployment 
benefits in the inequality frame (significantly different from control group with p = 0.002). 
This could be expected as well, because concerns about inequality and poverty should 
increase support for social protection. Both findings are statistically and substantially 
significant, as support drops by nine percentage points and more importantly, the median 
respondent swings from supporting retrenchment in the control group to supporting the 
benefits in both treatments.  
The group exposed to the deficit frame is more in support of retrenchment than the 
participants exposed to the objective frame or the inequality frame (significantly smaller at 
respectively p = 0.003 and p = 0.002). The average support in this condition resembles the 
control group. Given the effects of the previous treatments, this is not a null finding. By 
emphasizing debts and deficits rather than inequality, support swings to retrenchment of the 
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programme. In other words, the deficit frame produces a rightward shift in favour of 
retrenchment which offsets the leftward shift induced by objective economic news. Hence, 
although the treatment does seem ineffective if compared to the control group, it does not if 
compared to the objective and inequality treatment. This supports H5. 
 
Figure I. Proportion of respondents supporting cuts in unemployment benefits for 
different treatments (with 95% confidence intervals) 
 
 
Does income matter for supporting unemployment benefits? 
We present the results of our logistic regression analyses graphically in Figure II (full tables 
in appendix). Figure II presents in the left panel the differences in support for retrenchment 
for different income groups between the control group and the three treatments (marginal 
effects of the interaction term between income and treatments). To make comparisons 
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between the treatments the right panel of Figure II presents the differences in support for 
retrenchment between the objective frame treatment and the other two treatments.  
We find that the treatment effects differ by income group. In the objective frame support for 
retrenchment is dramatically reduced among low incomes (significantly different from low 
incomes in the control group at p = 0.001). This verifies H2. Interestingly, participants in the 
middle-income group were not more receptive for supporting unemployment benefits in the 
objective frame compared to the control group. However, individuals in the high-income 
group were less in support of retrenchment in the objective frame (significantly different 
from high incomes in control group at p = 0.05). In the inequality frame the middle-income 
group is significantly more in support of maintaining unemployment benefits (significantly 
different from control group at p = 0.04) just like the other two income groups. The 
differences between the objective frame and the inequality frame are however tiny and 
therefore inequality aversion does not seem to add to the objective information. Apparently 
poor economic prospects already activate inequality concerns or demands for insurance 
among all income groups. Therefore we reject H3.  
In the deficit frame we find that all three income groups do not differ from the control group, 
but the low (p<0.01) and high incomes (p<.05) do support retrenchment more than in the 
objective condition. Especially for low incomes it is striking that they are also susceptible to 
the right-wing message in the deficit frame and do not show stronger support for 
unemployment benefits as in the other conditions. Overall we conclude that self-interest – 
based on income – has a limited moderating effect on our treatments.  
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Figure II. Differences in proportion of respondents supporting cuts in unemployment 
benefits by income group between control group and experimental conditions (left 
panel) and between objective frame and inequality and deficit frame (right panel) 
 
Note: Points represent difference in proportions between a respective income category in the 
treatment and in the control group (left panel) and between an income category in the 
treatment and the objective frame treatment (right panel). Bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals.  
 
Do Partisans and Independents Respond Differently to the Same Information? 
It appears from our previous analysis that ideologically biased messages blur class 
differences. If this is the case, party identification as a heuristic capturing ideological 
variation should be an influential variable. Indeed, party identification is a powerful 
moderator of our treatments (Figure III – based on the logistic regression appendix Table 
A3). Along the lines of our theoretical argument, independents drive the results when 
exposed to the objective frame. While they exhibit a twenty percentage point difference to 
untreated independents, no significant effect can be found for partisans of either camp. This 
supports H7. 
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In the inequality condition, left partisans can be mobilised against retrenchment, too. As 
predicted in H4, this group reacts stronger to the inequality frame than to objective 
information while the additional sentence makes hardly a difference for independents.  
 
Figure III. Differences in proportion of respondents supporting cuts in unemployment 
benefits by party identification between control group and experimental conditions (left 
panel) and between objective frame and inequality and deficit frame (right panel)  
 
Note: Points represent difference in proportions between a respective income category in the 
treatment and in the control group (left panel) and between an income category in the 
treatment and the objective frame treatment (right panel). Bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals.  
 
The deficit frame is interesting for three reasons. First, it has no effect on left partisans, who 
seem to ignore the ‘right-wing message’. This mirrors the behaviour of right partisans in the 
inequality condition. Second, it mobilises support for retrenchment among right wing 
partisans as predicted by H6. In this group the treated individuals show a thirteen percentage 
point increase of support (p<.05) compared to the objective condition. Third, the negative 
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effect among the independents that we observed in the objective condition disappears. Their 
support for retrenchment is significantly stronger in the deficit condition compared to the 
objective condition (p<.05). Our interpretation is that independents have more ideological 
flexibility which makes them responsive to the deficit frame. In sum, the results support our 
H4, H6 and H7. Party identification is a strong psychological mechanism filtering economic 
information with clear effects on support for welfare state retrenchment. 
 
Discussion 
The effect of economic fluctuation on social and economic policy preferences is disputed in 
the literature. This paper demonstrates that poor economic prospects drive support for 
sustaining generous unemployment benefits rather than increasing support for retrenchment. 
On a general level, this supports observational studies finding a leftward shift in times of high 
unemployment and refutes the argument that welfare support is a luxury reserved for good 
economic times. However, we also showed that it matters crucially how elites frame poor 
economic prospects. We found that the objective message as well as an emphasis on 
inequality increase support for unemployment benefits especially among independents and 
left-wing partisans. However, independents and right-wing partisans shift their support to 
retrenching unemployment benefits if the poor economic prospects are associated with 
government debt and budget deficit. Our treatments – in the form of small alterations to the 
text – even caused a preference shift of the mean respondent. 
Our finding that independents do most of the preference shifting reinforces the model put 
forward by Kayser and Wlezien (2011) which demonstrates that only non-partisans engage in 
economic voting. This implies that partisans tend to ignore economic changes which could 
lead them to discount their own economic interest. Indeed, self-interest – based on income 
differences – had limited explanatory power in our experiment. However, we do 
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acknowledge that self-interest could work through different mechanisms such as 
unemployment risk.  
Party identification is an almost classical explanatory variable in studies of voting behaviour. 
While research into social policy preferences often ignores the concept, our results show that 
partisan bias is highly relevant. We thus we recommend researchers to make use of questions 
on party identification in standard comparative data sets, such as the European Social Survey. 
By employing a survey experiment our study solves the problem that observational studies 
cannot separate the effects of the objective and subjective economy on political preferences. 
Together with a small but emerging literature (Kangas et al., 2014; Malhotra & Margalit, 
2010; Petersen et al., 2012; Wenzelburger, 2014) our study reaffirms the importance of elite 
framing of the economy and partisanship in shaping preferences for economic policy. 
Experiments and framing studies in particular offer important analytical tools for a wide array 
of research question related to social policy preferences. 
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 Notes   
 
1 Type of crisis might matter. Erikson et al. ( 2002) find that unemployment drives public 
opinion to the left, but inflation drives public opinion to the right. 
2 We chose unemployment as an economic indicator rather than GDP growth or inflation, 
because unemployment is a very salient and intuitive indicator which has been frequently 
used in the literature. 
3 Accordingly, individuals are generally motivated by the desire to uphold ethical norms with 
regard to social equality and they are willing to discount material self-interest to do so. What 
these norms dictate exactly and how they are pursued should of course differ by cultural and 
political context. 
4 We use a survey rather than a laboratory experiment, because it provides better 
comparability to existing research (which is pre-dominantly based on survey data) and greater 
external validity. Moreover, survey experiments are typically used in framing studies. 
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Appendix 
For our operationalization of partisanship and income see main text. For education we created 
a dummy differentiating between respondents that finished university education (1) or not 
(0). We asked respondents for their gender (0: female, 1: male). Political knowledge is 
evaluated by means of 3 knowledge questions. First, who is the current chancellor of 
Germany? Second, who is the secretary-general of the United Nations? Third, who is the 
prime minister of the UK? Respondents provided open answers, and we were lenient vis-à-vis 
accepting misspelled names as correct (up to 4 errors). We categorized whether respondents 
had 0, 1, 2 or 3 correct answers. Finally, we also asked respondents’ age.  
Table A1. Descriptives per variable (no. of respondents per category). 
Policy choice (dv) Keep benefits Cut benefits   
1269 989   
Treatment Control Objective Inequality Deficit 
 558 575 565 560 
Partisanship Left Right Independent Other 
 617 675 920 46 
Income  Low Middle High  
 637 1374 247   
Education Not uni. Uni   
 1242 1016   
Gender Female Male   
 1087 1171   
Political knowledge 0 q’s correct 1 q correct 2 q’s correct 3 q’s correct 
69 459 1035 695 
Age Mean SD. Min Max 
 45.68 15.43 18 91 
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Table A2. Regressions with interaction treatment x income 
 
Model 1 
 Treatments (ref = control) B S.E. 
Objective frame -0.866* 0.272 
Inequality frame -0.647* 0.280 
Deficit frame -0.111 0.275 
   Income (ref = low) 
  Middle 0.015 0.239 
High 0.332 0.280 
   Treatment x Income 
  Objective x Middle 0.605 0.336 
Objective x High 0.339 0.384 
Inequality x Middle 0.238 0.344 
Inequality x High 0.171 0.396 
Deficit x Middle -0.049 0.340 
Deficit x High 0.130 0.394 
   University -0.053 0.105 
Male 0.221* 0.103 
Age -0.010* 0.003 
   Partisanship (ref = left) 
  Right 2.404* 0.163 
Independent 1.028* 0.129 
Other 0.916* 0.140 
   Political knowledge 0.009 0.056 
Constant -0.343 0.265 
N 2258 
 R2 0.114 
 * p<.05 
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Table A3. Regressions with interaction treatment x partisans 
 
Model 2 
 Treatments (ref = control) B S.E. 
Objective frame -0.430 0.262 
Inequality frame -0.829* 0.287 
Deficit frame -0.318 0.269 
   Income (ref = low) 
  Middle 0.211 0.124 
High 0.471* 0.146 
   Treatment x Partisanship 
  Objective x Right 0.064 0.432 
Objective x Ind. -0.411 0.353 
Objective x Other 0.333 0.380 
Inequality x Right 1.008 0.454 
Inequality x Ind. 0.133 0.379 
Inequality x Other 0.499 0.401 
Deficit x Right 0.859 0.481 
Deficit x Ind. 0.004 0.364 
Deficit x Other 0.377 0.384 
   University -0.046 0.105 
Male 0.227* 0.103 
Age -0.010* 0.003 
   Partisanship (ref = left) 
  Right 1.933* 0.312 
Independent 1.120* 0.256 
Other 0.628* 0.267 
   Political knowledge 0.005 0.056 
Constant -0.347 0.262 
N 2258 
 R2 0.116 
 * p<.05 
 
 
 
